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1 Philosophy and its History
Philosophy has a history. Or, to put it more accurately, we can say that philoso-
phy is in history and it has a history. Both elements constitute its historicity. It is,
in its entirety as well as in every respective concrete form, in history, part of a
comprehensive, temporal and factual history that precedes and exceeds it; and
it has a history—its own history, that determines its character and its course. Phi-
losophy shares this characteristic with other intellectual and cultural formations,
with music, religion, the nation, football—in which both of these aspects of his-
toricity also always exert their influence. These too are all historically situated
and happen as history. Its particular history is part of a general history, the his-
tory of the collective, of the epoch, of culture, of humanity and, in other respects,
of nature, of being.
1.1 Philosophy’s Relatedness to History
Nevertheless, the realization that philosophy has a history is no triviality. This is
because philosophy is historical and has a history in ways that differ from those
of medicine or Baroque music (let alone the glaciers). Philosophy is a cultural
formation that is essentially historical and this in the sense that it is not only fac-
tically rooted in history and historically conditioned but further in that it is con-
stitutively related to its history. This is first of all a descriptive, distinctive char-
acteristic of philosophy which conspicuously sets it apart from other sciences
and cultural forms. A glance at philosophical research as well as at teaching,
the conference calendar, publishing brochures, libraries and course catalogues
sufficiently demonstrates this. Next to systematic themes and research questions
of applied ethics up to ontology we find a many-sided pre-occupation with the
history of philosophy as well as with individual authors and movements, epochs
and with the history of philosophy as a whole. This kind of relatedness to history
appears to be an essential characteristic of philosophy. However, it is an ambiv-
alent and controversial basic feature of philosophizing. Historicity conflicts with
philosophy’s claim to truth, a claim which aims at a trans-historical knowledge
that is not bound by the conditions of time. The separation of genesis and val-
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idity should uncouple the validity of an insight from its factical genesis. From the
beginning philosophy maintains itself in opposition to relativism, to which be-
longs a return to subjective suppositions as well as to historiographical contex-
tualization and to genealogical foundations. The tension between the claim to
truth and consciousness of historicity appears to be inherent in prominent phil-
osophical positions. The split manifests itself in the self-understanding of philos-
ophy as well as in the external judgment of it. Respect and contempt for the his-
toriographical stand immediately opposed in the conflict between purely
systematic and historical-philological work. This conflict plays itself out between
the apparent self-evidence of broad and highly elaborated historiographical re-
search on the one hand and the critical rejection of classical readings as well
as an equally differentiated conceptual-systematic discussion on the other.
It is a controversy that cannot simply be resolved by taking a strategic posi-
tion for one or the other side. Even if this fundamental relatedness to history des-
ignates a controversial situation, it nonetheless stands for a distinctive and basic
feature of philosophy that cannot be struck out unless one wants to engage in an
arbitrary redefinition of the discipline. Philosophy, as a way of thinking that
evolved historically and was shaped throughout its development by culture, is
characterized by a strong relatedness to its history. It constitutes the overarching
framework and lies at the basis of a common language within which philoso-
phers negotiate their themes, articulate their hypotheses and contest opposing
concepts; allowing for diversification and dissent, it makes possible a coherent
expert discourse. The history of philosophy, as Wilfred Sellars says, forms the lin-
gua franca of philosophy.¹
1.2 The Continuity of Philosophy
At the same time, the relatedness to history is not only a controversial basic fea-
ture of philosophy but above all one that requires elucidation. This relatedness
remains to be clarified, just as much as the question in which sense it is a con-
stitutive element of philosophy. The historiography of philosophy is not external
to philosophy; it does not occur as an auxiliary discipline, an external, optional
supplement such as, for example, the way in which medical history is related to
medical research. Rather, in classical concepts it becomes an integral part of phi-
losophy itself (see, for example, Hegel). Externally its coherence manifests in the
fact that the historiography of philosophy doesn’t appear primarily in historio-
 Sellars (1967), 1.
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graphical research or in the historiography of ideas in cultural studies. It is not
studied primarily by historians but by philosophers. Philosophy writes its own
history and does not hand it over to the professional expertise of historiogra-
phers. Likewise, the history of philosophy is read, interpreted and appropriated
by philosophy itself. The historiography of philosophy stands for a specific re-
flexivity of philosophy, which relates in a specific way to itself in its relation
to history. Elucidating this self-relatedness is an essential part of explicating
the historiography of philosophy as well as of philosophy itself.
First of all a general characteristic must be identified which is associated
with this self-relatedness in the medium of history. It can be located in the un-
usual continuity of philosophy. Even if the history of philosophy, as other cultur-
al fields, is characterised by breaks, innovative new beginnings, diversions and
losses, it is a fact that Western philosophy, which originated in Greece, is distin-
guished from other cultural creations through a progressive series of connections
and references perpetuated through the epochs. It belongs not only to the oldest
and most prestigious creations of this exceptionally creative epoch, in which
many forms of European culture, artworks and sciences have their origin.
Above all it is characterised by a unique kind of retrocursive relatedness both
to earlier positions as well as to the beginning of the discipline and its history
as a whole. The philosophers of late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and of the mod-
ern and contemporary eras work out their views and acquire their self-under-
standing by entering into dialogue with earlier authors and grappling with
their own pre-history, a pre-history that they partly inherit and partly write
anew, critically revise or dismiss. The pre-eminent meaning of the origin, namely
the powerful impression Plato and Aristotle made on philosophical discourse is
quite different to that made by the histories of Thucydides and Herodotus’s on
historiography or that made by Greek sculpture on the fine arts. The beginning
not only had actual effects in subsequent history but it remains as that to which
philosophy in the present attaches itself to or pushes off from. The communica-
tive community in which every science develops in the case of philosophy ex-
pands from a synchronic to a diachronic dialogue with earlier generations.
1.3 The Historicity of Spirit
Why this is so remains to be clarified. The substantial, philosophical hypothesis
which corresponds to these external characteristics of philosophy’s relatedness to
history and the continuity of philosophical discourse is that of the hypothesis of
a fundamental historicity of thinking. In a pronounced fashion Hegel had worked
this out in such a way that he doesn’t read it as a form of temporal relativism
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but as an immanent historicity of reason. The historicity of reason and the rational-
ity of history are contradictory indications, within this immanent intertwinement of
philosophical thought and its history. The hypothesis of reason in history is obvious-
ly a strong one and rich in presuppositions, which Hegel believes to be the only a
priori to a philosophical theory of history. But this is not merely a precondition, he
thinks, but a demonstrandum and a result of the accomplished and material mean-
ing of world-history, at the same time. Historical knowledge had to prove that his-
tory happened rationally. It is a basic hypothesis that is also, in Hegel, affected by
the immanent tension between historicity and the claim to truth. It is the ambiva-
lence of a form of thinking and reflection that developed in time and appears
with the claim to the highest knowledge since its beginnings.
In this context, the history of philosophy is up for debate in two respects. To
draw on a conventional German conceptual distinction, even though it tends not
to be used consistently, it concerns the “history” [“Geschichte”] and the “histor-
iography” [“Historie”] of philosophy respectively.What is at stake here is the tem-
poral development of the matter itself, of philosophical thinking, as well as its
representation and reflective recollection. Both are essential for an understand-
ing of the historicity of philosophy, and both became object of philosophical the-
ories. These theories are interested in the way in which thought essentially devel-
ops in time, is based on what preceded it, takes this in and alters it, progressing
according to laws or through ruptures and unpredictable innovations. But it also
concerns how philosophy itself is retrocursively related to its past, how this past
is recollected and interpreted, the latter being the function of the historiography
of philosophy [Philosophiehistorie] for philosophy.When I referred to ‘meaning of
the history of philosophy’ in the title of this paper, this formulation points in
both of these directions. On the one hand, it can be understood as the question
concerning how far the development of thought possesses an immanent mean-
ing, a teleological tendency² and on the other it can be understood as the ques-
tion of what meaning and function the historiography of philosophy has for phi-
losophy. The focal point of the following considerations is the second reading. I
will not focus on considerations on the course of philosophical thinking
throughout the ages but rather on questions concerning the logic and function
of the recollection of philosophy. It concerns, schematically, the meaning of
the historiography [Historie] and not of the history [Geschichte] of philosophy.
However it should be noted that the two analytically distinct aspects—“history”
and “historiography”—cannot really be detached from one another. This applies to
both the history of worldly events as well as to the history of ideas. History is not
 One such direction of questioning comes to fruition in Stekeler-Weithofer (2006).
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simply the objective course and totality of past facts. It is a course of events in so far
as it is of concern for the “subject” in question, is important and present to it, if it is
reflected by him and appropriated through him. By means of the unity of both as-
pects a distinction can be made between what is commonly called history (human
history) and objectively occurring processes in nature (the “history” of the Alps or of
the universe). Also for philosophical-historical reflection the reciprocal interference
of both sides is important and to some degree it constitutes the very point of con-
ceptual history. History becomes human history only insofar as humans become
aware of it, grasp it and insofar as it becomes controllable through reason, at
least ideally. According to Marx we only speak of real history when people take des-
tiny into their own hands and themselves determine the conditions of life.³ Hegel
envisions an even more radical entanglement of both sides when he situates the
philosophy of history itself historically, claiming that the possibility of understand-
ing history rationally is itself a result of the world-historical process of liberation.
Firstmodern humanity is able to translate the rational claim of nature into the
human world and to recognize the immanent ratio in the wealth of human produc-
tions. Both the philosophy of history [Geschichtsphilosophie] as well as the history of
philosophy [Philosophiegeschichte] have, in this sense, their genuine place in the
present.
2 The Writing and Reading of History
Before we further explore the function of the historiography of philosophy, the
more fundamental question concerning its logic arises: in what forms and in ac-
cordance with what criteria does philosophy turn to its past and recollect its his-
tory? The logic of the historiography of philosophy, in this regard, embraces the
logic of writing as well as that of reading, the construction as well as the recep-
tion of the history of thought—a unique entwining, which is based on the fact
that that the historiography of philosophy on its part too is based on reading
and practices a kind of reading. Similarly the question of the meaning of the his-
tory of philosophy encompasses the concerns of both side. Only a few aspects
concerning the history of philosophy will be mentioned in the following.
 Marx (1968), 546, 544, 570.
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2.1 The Object of the Historiography of Philosophy
First, the historiography of philosophy is confronted with the question of what
its object is. More accurately it concerns the extensional question of what is to
be counted as within the field of philosophy and its history. Normally the delim-
itation of a subject area pre-necessitates an undisputed definition of philosophy
that decides to what extent a history of philosophy ought to consider poetry,
medicine, law and theology, the natural sciences and myths. Classical german
lexicons such as the Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie or the Historische
Wörterbuch der Philosophie suggest different demarcations. Rather than adhering
to the confines of academic disciplines and publications, Kurt Flasch suggests to
focus on the argumentative substance of texts and to work with an open concept
of philosophy that is to be tested concretely.⁴ At the same time the level on which
philosophical thinking is or should be historically reconstructed is up for discus-
sion. Historiographical studies are concerned with individual works and authors,
with the development of concepts and problems, with currents, schools and ep-
ochs even including a comprehensive history of Western (or even human) think-
ing; and the approaches to this can be comparative, systematic or narrative-syn-
thetic. A particular range, which the historical understanding of past philosophy
covers, is that between intellectual work of individuals on the one hand and the
“objective”, trans-individual development of philosophical thought on the other.
In this regard, Dieter Henrich⁵ distinguishes between the history of the genesis of
significant works on the basis of drafts, revisions and editions which have be-
come accessible in the past two centuries and which were not available before
and the genesis of the philosophical insights of their authors, on the other
hand, which evolve through the typical stages of the perception of a deficit
and of a problem, of absorbing new perspectives in their relevance for the imma-
nent theory and their relatedness to life, their lengthy elaboration, differentiation
and review. According to Henrich, “constellation research” complements the
study of the genesis of works. It integrates the individual work and the author
into a network of contemporary and historical discourses and it traces the recip-
rocal challenges, suggestions, adaptions and disassociations in their entangle-
ment. On the whole a genuine intertwining of inner and outer perspectives be-
longs to such reconstructions and it inscribes the individual conception in a
comprehensive development and, inversely, brings claims to objective knowl-
 Flasch (2005), 17– 19.
 Henrich (2011), 8.
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edge to bear on the historical position. For the epistemology of historiography,
both are associated with open questions.
2.2 The Unity and Diversity of Philosophy
What is in question is the extent to which we are concerned with one and the
same way of thinking, with one and the same project in exploring diverse devel-
opments. It is a question that analogously confronts the attempt to integrate a
scattered sequence of events and settings into a regional, national or even
human history. Historiographical philosophical construction too has to take
into consideration breaks, innovations that are not merely derived from the pre-
ceding and paths that lead nowhere as well as developments and continuations
related thereto, without refuting one by the other. On a structural as well as dia-
chronic level it is confronted with the dichotomy of reference and distance, unity
and heterogeneity. The balance between discontinuity and continuity is a ques-
tion for concrete historiographical-philological research. The antagonistic and
polemical character has been understood as an almost essential feature of phi-
losophy as developing in conflict, a character that even becomes apparent to his-
toriographical perception: for philosophical thinking maintains itself essentially
in conflict with other, earlier views.⁶ However, connections between problems
are also striking and the formation of schools and traditions right up to the pe-
riodization and classification of epochs belongs constitutively to the historio-
graphical form of philosophy. Their definition remains a construction that is to
be solidified or criticised within substantive work. Here the basic problem of di-
versity affects not only the synthesizing needed for attaining a unified form or
narrative. It is, in its virulence, a provocation to the truth claims of philosophy.
Such a plurality raises the question of how the conflict between systems is com-
patible with the claims to knowledge made by philosophy. This problem estab-
lishes an obstacle for philosophy’s self-understanding in that it demands that
the plurality of positions be treated along the lines of works of art and styles
or understands philosophies as co-existing worldviews. Philosophy remains,
even in temporal and spatial dispersal, one project of thought that is distinguish-
ed through its overriding will to knowledge and a singular internal relatedness.
 Gueroult (1956), 47 f.
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2.3 Historiographical Understanding
Finally the question arises as to the kind of theoretical attention to history. In
what way is the historiography of philosophy to engage the specific claim to
truth of its object? The following answer suggests itself: it relates discursively-ar-
gumentatively to the concerned philosophy, whose claim to validity it takes seri-
ously and discusses critically. Thus it is taken into account that, as a philosoph-
ical discipline, it belongs to the discursive continuum of its object. Another
perspective is offered by the literary-historical approach in which the genesis,
the statements and the character of philosophical documents are explained
from the outside; in a similar way a psychological or sociological reading can
extrapolate the contingency of past views instead of their internal validity.
Viewed abstractly, here conceptual-systematic and external-historiographical
perspectives are juxtaposed. However remaining in such dichotomies appears
unsatisfactory for a historiographical understanding of philosophy. The histori-
ography of philosophy cannot restrict itself to oscillating between either tempo-
ral relativism or truth independent of time, between anticipating the unfamiliar
and a translation of the unfamiliar into the familiar. It operates in the in-be-
tween, in mediation between resisting both historical relativism and schematic
de-historization. Its basis is the insight into the fundamental historicity of past
as well as current knowledge. Historical contextualization does not mean the ref-
utation of preceding opinions or even a suspension of the truth-claims of knowl-
edge. According to Kurt Flasch “[C]ontingent conditions of genesis” do not refute
an argument but “position it”; generally historiographical philosophy moves nei-
ther in trans-temporal nor in merely local formations but in rules and forms of
thinking that are marked by a “medium duration and extension of validity”.⁷
What is important in the historiographical analysis of ideas is to work out
both the rational intelligibility of the formation of ideas and how it is compre-
hensible by external factors. It is precisely when positions are taken seriously
in their truth claims that they can also be historiographically situated through
critical judgment and can be interlinked with a certain perception of history.
Where this is the case ideas of a directed, teleological development, even ra-
tional progress, which Hegel saw as is inherent in history, can be registered. Still
such “historization” does not necessarily need to be carried out with the sense of
an emphatic supposition of rationality, much less be expanded to a putative
overall course of the history of thought. Even “weaker” ways of reading, ways
which are less rich in presuppositions, provide a genuine historiographical intel-
 Flasch (2005), 51, 70.
52 Emil Angehrn
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 31.05.16 15:00
ligibility that illuminates both the individual work and the standpoint of current
thinking. Such readings can emphasize the connections and interrelations of his-
torical concepts and thereby not only span different times and spaces but take
into consideration connections in their different modalities of receptions and
criticisms, traditions and projects, variations and further continuations. Beyond
the alternative of disillusionment and legitimation such reconstruction provides
a historiographical knowledge that has not only object-related relevance. Histor-
iographical philosophical consideration concerns philosophy’s own reflective-
ness. Philosophy becomes self-aware in its reflection on its history⁸. To clarify
the form and content of this hypothesis, it must be considered within the horizon
of the general question of the function of historiographical philosophy.
3 The Meaning of the Relatedness to History
Why should it not be possible to engage in philosophy in a strictly subject relat-
ed manner, independently of historiographical references? What is the central
importance, the possibly indispensible function of the historiography of philos-
ophy, its own non-contingent interest in its history? Not only the actual writing of
the history of philosophy are at stake here but also the different forms of the re-
latedness to history in philosophical work, from a cursory reference to historio-
graphical positions, schools and trends in a thematic context, the reconstruction
of works, theoretical coherences and traditions right up to the philosophical in-
terpretation of ways of thinking as a whole. Obviously, the form and frequency of
such references vary greatly in the course of epochs, but seen as a whole, one
can speak of a growth in historiographical reflections of thinking, even if this
growth is not continual or linear. However, this does not mean that that its mo-
tive and necessity would become in equal measure more clear and precise. It
seems to me pointless to attempt to subsume the different kinds of interest in
the historiography of philosophy under one guiding idea. I propose to distin-
guish the external relation to the historiography of philosophy (III.1) from the in-
ternal, constitutive relatedness to history of philosophy and to differentiate the
latter according to three approaches. (III.2-III.4).⁹
 Such is a leading thesis of Stekeler-Weithofer (2006, 229) and Flasch (2005, 72); see III.4 below.
 The following draws partly on observations in Angehrn (2002).
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3.1 History as a Quarry of Ideas
The most unproblematic interpretation, at least to a certain extent, considers the
history of philosophy, as Hegel put it, as a “stock of opinions”.¹⁰ History is a fund
of theories, ways of apprehending, concepts and arguments, that current work in
philosophy and representatives of the subject can draw upon by virtue of their
professional competence. Current debates can rely on historiographical exam-
ples for the purposes of illustration, for the exploration of a thematic field
and the testing of solutions: in earlier theories explanations of concepts, argu-
mentative strategies, aporiai and suggestions for solutions were explored
which present work can draw upon and can gain a sense of direction from, con-
cerning certain difficulties and prospects of certain ways of thinking.
Likewise, the history of philosophy can become a privileged medium of ini-
tiation and teaching.While the introduction to technology and the natural scien-
ces occurs through praxis and the appropriation of basic principles, which both
are also essential for philosophy, the latter further proceeds via a familiarisation
with classical texts and discussions. Likewise, this ties communication to a com-
mon frame of reference which the formulation that historiography is the lingua
franca of philosophy indicates. The resorting to and command over shared refer-
ences (authors and concepts) is the precondition of any engagement, examina-
tion or debate in systematic discourse.
All this describes characteristics which explicate the manifest and close con-
nection between philosophy and the history of philosophy. Historiography as a
resource and a frame of reference sustains and regulates philosophical work.
But it is a bond that, so to speak,which remains external and does not determine
the philosophical way of thinking in its core. It remains to clarify in what sense
philosophy draws upon past theories and positions not only as material or as an
external frame but in the sense that it appropriates them as its own inner sub-
stance and in how far history forms a dimension of its own, forms a medium
in which it situates itself and takes place as itself. To this end, we can distinguish
three perspectives.
3.2 Historical Foundation and Argumentative Discourse
Philosophy is intertwined in a narrower way with history where historiographical
reflection touches upon the question of truth. The truth of past as well as present
 Hegel (1970), 28–36.
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thinking stands in question here. In a negative form this nexus strikes us as histor-
iographical relativizing: facing the fact of its origination in the past, the diversity
and mutability of thinking amounts to a calling into question, or at least to an in-
dication of the contingency of one’s own standpoint. Historicism is the basis of rel-
ativism and, further, every doctrine that wants to present itself as having an absolute
claim to validity seeks to situate itself outside of history or to construe history as a
development that is completed with its own appearance and which is external to the
validity of its results. That philosophy has a history initially appears to be a suspen-
sion of its own truth. Hence what suggests itself here is an attempt to posit the self-
authorization of reason as an abstraction from history, for example through a meth-
odological doubt as the forgetting of all tradition.¹¹
This contrasts with the opposed idea of the relatedness to history function-
ing as an authentication of philosophy, as a legitimating “proof of origin”.¹² This
can be the case with varying degrees of stringency. In the most general way in-
sertion into a history, the connection to predecessors and the appeal to author-
ities constitutes a mode of legitimation in both practical and theoretical respects.
Such a basic “tradition oriented” justification is familiar from the life-world and
is established in both a science-theoretical and hermeneutically regards, but
nonetheless can be still questioned. Its problematic adheres to philosophy in
the contrast between emphatic truth and the constitutive relatedness to tradi-
tion. One answer to this aporia is presented by the philosophical-historical
self-assurance of thinking which grasps the present as the destination of a his-
tory that comes to its truth and its conclusion in it. An exemplary implementa-
tion of this is achieved in Hegel’s reading of history as an affirmative self-expli-
cation and legitimation of spirit. History as the occurrence of truth and the
philosophy of history as theodicy are the conceptual stamp of such a foundation.
But even in weaker versions the founding upon history can be articulated. Such
can be seen in Aristotle’s endeavour to support his own theories by appealing to
the consensus hominum et temporum. A minimal premise of such types of argu-
mentation is represented in the unity of history: the fact, that the progress of
philosophical thought in the change of themes and dogmas is also understood
as one development, in which the scattered voices are related in criticism and
continuation. But what is essential for the potential for truth of such connections
is that this is carried out as an argument and discussion with history that is ori-
ented towards what is valid.What matters most centrally here is a discursive ex-
amination that is oriented to the matter itself, that includes past positions as well
 See Beelmann (2001), 15.
 Beelmann (2001), 15.
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as contemporary statements in a dialogue rather than fixing them in a historiciz-
ing manner as facts and understanding them as certain convictions or as the re-
sults of developments. In such an attitude of a reflective historiography of phi-
losophy, as distinguished from cultural-historical writing, past documents are
interpreted in their claim to validity.
Not least is the insight into the historicity of knowledge of importance here,
which does not intend a mere relativism. Rather it is aimed at integrating itself
into a history and thus makes possible a discussion between different positions
across times and spaces. It bridges the alleged incommensurability of divergent
ways of understanding in that it opens them towards each other from out of over-
arching contexts. Thus it does not level down all claims to validity but on the
contrary enables the discourse of legitimation and critical comparison. Historical
consciousness is the pre-condition of a disclosing understanding as well as a ra-
tional and evaluating reference wherein the genetic reconstruction sustains crit-
ical examination of rational claims and, inversely the reflection on validity sus-
tains the moment of the disclosing of meaning.
3.3 Remembrance and Continuation of Writing
The historiography of philosophy has, like cultural history in general, a purpose
insofar as it participates in history: to keep the past alive and continue human-
ity’s conversation into the future. Remembrance is a leitmotif of historical retro-
spection. In certain ways, this thrust of historiography approaches that which
seems strangest to a philosophizing focused on the present: the retaining and
cultivation of the by-gone for its own sake. It is the piety of preservation that
Nietzsche attributed to what he calls the antiquarian historiographical attitude.
Taken for itself it will not be primarily regarded as a constitutive moment of phi-
losophizing. However it is thoroughly intertwined with the intrinsic motives of
philosophical thinking. Philosophy shares in the dynamic of historicity, rooted
in the fact that it can be addressed by the past and can respond to questions
that the past directs at it. Derrida has emphasized that philosophical writing par-
takes of a duty to the past and relinquishes a debt to it: a debt towards the un-
said, the submerged and the displaced. Insofar as philosophy is confronted with
this duty, it is interested in history for its own sake. By connecting to the past it
discloses latent potentialities of the past that have not been voided and contin-
ues to write a history that was inherent in it but was not explicated. It continues
a conversation whose historical radicality is not only related to the past but in
equal measure reaches towards the future. As Rorty says, it is the highest task
of philosophy to keep humanity’s conversation from breaking off. When philos-
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ophy turns to its own history there is an irreducible interest not only in knowl-
edge but in remembrance as such. In this, philosophy is both part of and an out-
standing instance of historiographical culture as such.
3.4 The Historical Self-Understanding of Philosophy
In addition to discursive discussion and the remembering of tradition, historiogra-
phy serves self-orientation and self-understanding. It is not only the truth of projects
and concepts that is in question in the dialogue with the past; what is also of inter-
est are its content and horizons of meaning, the directions of its questioning and its
presuppositions. It is necessary to understand oneself in hindsight and to win clarity
about one’s activities and research. I want to specify this—deepest and most exten-
sive—orientation of the interest in history from three angles.
On the one hand the historiographical perspective promotes better understand-
ing insofar as it can elucidate the past evolution and the broader context of that un-
derstanding. This task is central in relation to thinking and the course of its devel-
opment. We better understand a hypothesis, an argument, an intention when we
trace the context of problems to which it responds, what experiences underlie
them, and possibly in what ways it assimilated earlier formulations and attempts
at solution which are hidden within it or only readable in traces. Historical analysis
can reveal layers that remain concealed to direct descriptive access. This is true for
the understanding of the other as well as the understanding of itself. Historical
background and the genetic perspective allow a deeper understanding of cultural
formations for both its subjects and for external observers.
On the other hand historical reflection serves not only a retrospective (self‐)
understanding but also prospective self-discovery. It is not only about an appro-
priate interpretation of a traditional teaching, but about ascertaining from the
dialogue with the past what we are getting at in our own research and what
we ask after in our work. Here the driving motivation is not the corroboration
of the answer but the clarity of the question.
We find an eloquent testimony to such self-orientation through dialogue
with the past in the earliest phase of philosophy. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a clas-
sical and fundamental work of the discipline named after it, does not propagate
any speculation about first and last things. Rather the whole first book is devot-
ed to determining what its concerns and objects are. The “science that it sought
for”—as the guiding principle of the discussion—is gained via a pre-meditation
of the highest, most eminent knowledge on the one hand and on the other
through conversations with predecessors, with the Pre-Socratics and Plato.
Their approaches are explored and elucidated so as to provide a twofold
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proof, namely that they all researched into first causes and principles and that
this research operated within the framework of Aristotle’s conceptualization of
the four causes. From this the project of a first philosophy received its concretion
and its historiographical attestation and authentication. The remark that the
older thinkers worked on the project put forward by Aristotle but without ex-
pressly knowing it is revealing: First they dealt with what, with hindsight can
be seen as their true concern, in a way that was “obscure”, “stammering” and
“unclear”.¹³ Philosophy gains a sense of its own path not by looking back at
an initial foundational act but in conversation with a way of thinking that is
still unsure of itself, a tentative beginning, that for its part first gains its clear
orientation in extrapolation.
The opening book of the Aristotelian Metaphysics is exemplary insofar as it
refers to the structural problem of beginning and first ascertains its goal while
looking back at pre-history, out of which this self-ascertainment occurs. Such ret-
rospection is essentially hermeneutical, intertwining understanding and commu-
nication, the exegesis of the origin and the act of beginning and self-orientation
are intertwined. This consciousness of origin corresponds to a hermeneutic char-
acteristic, which is likewise emphasised within deconstruction, insofar as it goes
back to a tentative, underdetermined origin, not an underlying Eidos or an iden-
tifiable “primal foundation” which contains progress as a telos which is to be un-
folded. Even without the support of a substantialist philosophy of history with
firm original, developmental and purposive guidelines, historical reflection func-
tions as the medium of self-understanding and self-discovery.
What the Aristotelian example illustrates with regard to the self-definition of
philosophy can be analogously applied to particular themes and questions. At-
tention to history contains a hermeneutic-heuristic potential that aids communi-
cation about the content, the direction, the premises and the problems of certain
questions. Questions concerning the immortality of the soul or the historicality of
science, concerning the limits of the state or the legitimate grounds of subjective
freedom are not, at all times, taken seriously as questions or even understood.
Many leading concepts of philosophy are historically and culturally situated con-
cepts in that they emerge and are worked out, modified and differentiated in a
certain real and ideal historical framework and, as the case may be, fade and
dissolve. To become conscious of its historicity belongs to the elucidation of
its content and direction and impacts the negotiation of topics that have been
treated in current discussions. Current philosophy does not simply realize itself
from out of the present. It is not exhausted in the sum of current knowledge; its
 See Aristotle, Met. I.4, 985 a 5– 18; I.7, 988 a 18–23; I.10, 993 a 12–17.
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“state of the art” is grasped deficiently when cut off from history. Philosophical
theories and their objects are, to a wide extent, historically impregnated and can-
not be adequately grasped in their content and applied without explication of
this historiographical density. Historiography is not only an external so to
speak technical contribution to conceptual work but a way of penetrating into
its material and self-orienting in one’s own research.
A particular aspect of such communication is that in the historiographical
look the external perspective acquires validity. History is the medium in which
I encounter the strange but also the dimension in which I perceive myself
from outside, from the other. In a particular way historiographical reflection is
the medium of self-understanding where it is confronted with what was sup-
pressed, marginalized or shut out in the history of thought, where it re-endows
self-consciousness with what had been lost to it, what had been forgotten within
it. In this sense Husserl’s Crisis makes manifest the life-world as the forgotten
fundament of meaning for science through historical retrospection. History
works out the repressed of this history, becomes aware of what is other to this
history itself. A form of thought can in the reconstruction of its genesis win an
adequate understanding of its uniqueness, its determining motives and also
its limits; philosophy can become aware of what, in its dominant form, was
pushed back (non-European, female, non-academic philosophy) and of what re-
mains unthought in its concepts (corporeality, nature, ontological difference).
The relatedness to history is situated, in all of this, in the horizon of a self-en-
lightenment of philosophy—a deeper understanding of its self-definition as
well as its motives, leading concepts and open questions.
4 Conclusion
History is the medium of self-knowledge.What humanity is, according to Dilthey,
is recounted by history.What philosophy is, is revealed by its history; the histor-
iography of philosophy as its reflexive recollection is the becoming self-con-
scious of philosophy, its accountability towards itself and its self-enlightenment.
One can put the emphasis in this process more firmly on history or on historiog-
raphy. Following a suggestion of Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, the course of philo-
sophical thinking could be thought as a coherent developmental-process of the
spirit in which initial open-endedness and ambivalences of the forms of human
understanding are gradually resolved—not necessarily as a lawful and necessary
higher development towards complete and perfect truth, but rather as a process
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of gradual self-clarification and disambiguation of thinking.¹⁴ Correspondingly,
the reflexive recollection of these processes can on its part be understood as a
mode of self-knowledge and this, according to Kurt Flasch, can be understood
as the motive and actual meaning of the historiography of philosophy.¹⁵ Walter
Jaeschke combines such self-knowledge with Hegel’s paradigmatic claim about
unity of philosophy and history of philosophy and reads this in terms of the re-
flexivity of philosophy. Philosophy has its truth, according to Hegel, ultimately in
the absolute self-relation of thinking, as he lays out in the three conclusions at
the end of the Encyclopaedia as three forms of philosophy’s turning back to itself
—to the forms of the absolute spirit, to the systematic representation of philo-
sophical sciences and to the history of philosophy which, although to Jaeschke,
there is no doubt that the last “historical form [is] comprehensive and fundamen-
tal.”¹⁶ The retrospective glance to the history of thinking, as a looking back to
spirit’s self-knowledge, is “if not the only, but the highest form of noesis noe-
seos.”¹⁷
However, such self-relation does not necessarily need to be conceived in
terms of a complete self-transparency of spirit in the Hegelian sense—an ideal
that has become alien to today’s thinking. Also quite independently of this it
can stand as a vanishing-point in the reflexivity of spirit and its historical becom-
ing conscious. Also what was for Hegel a further intertwinement between the
history of spirit and its historiographical reflection remains at least as a question
and as a task for current thinking, independently of Hegel’s absolutization. Ac-
cording to Hegel it is itself a fact of history that the historiography of philosophy
in the present has become possible and necessary: Only the modern subject
which is able to grasp itself in the world is able at the same time and prompted
to recognize itself in its thinking and willing. The genesis of the historiography of
philosophy is itself an index of the progressive status of the history of philoso-
phy, the historical self-explication of spirit; historical-reflectiveness belongs to
the historicality of thinking. The question remains, to what extent this step to
the becoming historical of thinking is irreversible. If post-metaphysical thinking
raises the issue of the constructiveness of the world and its self, it remains to be
seen to what extent its own history becomes increasingly present and easier to
access—or slips away from it and becomes abstract, without interest for it.
 Stekeler-Weithofer (2006), 229–231.
 Flasch (2005), 72.
 Jaeschke (2000), 500.
 Jaeschke (2000), 501.
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